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BOOK REVIEWS
DISCRETION AND LAWLESSNESS: COMPLIANCE IN THE
JUVENILE COURT
By James T. Sprowls
Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1980. 121 pages.
ISBN 0-669-03540-8

Reviewed by Abner J. Mikva*
Judges are always very disconcerted to discover that their decrees
are not being obeyed. The enforcement arm of the judiciary is most
modest; judges would much prefer to say, "It is so ordered," and go on
to the next case, rather than supervise the implementation of the last
case. With that mind set, I expected to squirm when I read Dr.
Sprowls' contribution to the field of juvenile justice and its reform. I
was not disappointed. In a little over one hundred pages, Dr. Sprowls
conclusively demonstrates that the juvenile courts of this country have
virtually ignored the landmark decisions of the Warren Court that held
that even children are entitled to due process of law. (This would suggest that children are "persons," which remains a point in controversy.)
In a very succinct manner, Dr. Sprowls reminds readers that in a
series of three cases, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the
Supreme Court sought to establish minimum standards for the treatment of juveniles in the various courts that had been specially designed
for them. Justice Fortas said it plainly: "Under our Constitution the
condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." 387 U.S.
at 28. It is, however, a source of great dismay to see how the juvenile
courts have proceeded to ignore, nay flout, the specific edicts of those
cases. Dr. Sprowls employs statistical data as well as case studies to
show that the courts specially designed for juveniles have consistently
refused to observe the fundamental rights to counsel, to standards of
proof, and to notice of charges.
Not only did most state legislatures also ignore the indictment of
their procedures issued by the Supreme Court, those few states, such as
Pennsylvania, that did seek to raise their standards found it easier to
pass laws than to ensure that they would be observed. The most egregious examples of lawlessness on the part of the juvenile courts are
found in Pennsylvania, where the specific provisions governing detention of juveniles are ignored in virtually every county in the state. One
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. J.D. cum
laude, University of Chicago, 1951.
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of the rules provides that juvenile offenders are not to be kept in adult
detention facilities when other facilities are available, and that, in any
event, juveniles are not to be detained in adult facilities for more than
five days. Dr. Sprowls shows that the only county in which this rule is
observed is the one in which the jailer of the adult facility refused to
take juveniles as a result of a dispute with the juvenile authorities having nothing to do with reform or better treatment for the youngsters.
And so courts may opine, and legislatures may proclaim, and juvenile injustice thrives unabated. Why?
Perhaps one-hundred pages is too short a space in which even to
touch on the real roots of this conundrum. Dr. Sprowls does talk about
the causes of the problem, but his, analysis only skims the surface.
Clearly Dr. Sprowls is fascinated with the relationship between discretion and noncompliance. Indeed, the major thesis of his book is that
the greater the discretion afforded the juvenile courts, the easier it is to
sweep what rules there are under the rug. Yet administrative agencies
with broad discretion frequently follow the rules of the courts and the
policymakers. Certainly the regulatory agencies of the federal government have manifested nothing like the massive resistance to reform
that we encounter with juvenile court judges. Dr. Sprowls acknowledges that public support or hostility to the decisions does play a major
role. He points to Brown v. Boardof Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as
having spoken "to such politically and socially sensitive issues" that
resistance was inevitable. But he suggests that such issues are the exception rather than the rule and that reform of the juvenile courts has
not engendered the same kind of intense hostility.
It is at this point that the analysis is less than complete. The dilemma of juvenile justice cannot be explained by reference to the
breadth or intensity of popular acceptance of, or opposition to, reform
efforts. Rather, we must look to the profound ambivalence, shared by
virtually everyone, about how to treat children.
How many schools have written codes enumerating the rights and
duties of their students? (I once tried to help some students in my former congressional district to obtain such a code and found it as hot a
political potato as any I ever had handled.) How many civil libertarians feel as permissive about their own children as they do about other
people's children? How can one reconcile the opposing positions in the
debate about the minimum drinking age in the states? Who can synthesize the various state laws and local ordinances restricting the availability of books, magazines, and films to juveniles? In sum, the public
attitude toward juvenile delinquency is very hard to describe or predict.
We know that children are somewhat different from adults, but we are
not even sure whether that is good news or bad, whether they should be
better or worse, or even when they become persons in the legal sense.
In fairness to the author, it must be noted that he does acknowledge
the existence of this American puzzlement. He quotes from the
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Supreme Court's retrenchment in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 551 (1971), where the Court put a hold on its earlier moves to
reform:
If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one
day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.
In McKeiver, the Court refused to extend the right to jury trial to
juveniles, and Dr. Sprowls concludes that, in doing so, the Court "entered perhaps the strangest defense of juvenile court practice on record." Unfortunately, there is little beyond this reference in the book to
indicate the author's awareness of the overwhelming ambivalence that
Americans have about their children.
That is a mild omission, compared with all that is crammed into
this little book. If you have worried why there are so many juveniles
who are delinquent, why their number grows steadily from year to
year, why what we do seems so counterproductive, and why the reform
schools neither reform nor teach, then you ought to read Dr. Sprowls'
book. It confirms what most observers have suspected: the juvenile
justice system is as delinquent as its wards.

POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES
By Larry W. Yackle
The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., Rochester N.Y., Bancroft-Whitney Co., San
Francisco, Calif., 1981. 776 pages.

Reviewed by Patrick J. McGann, Jr.*
Legal history teaches that a judiciary, bent on accomplishing a perceived good, will not hesitate to develop a procedural mechanism to
attain its goal. In that sense Professor Yackle's PostconvicionRemedies
is a well documented legal history book.
His subject is that area of the law dealing with the various forms of
collateral judicial review of criminal convictions. The purpose of that
review is to insure that rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution have been protected in the original trial, whether before a state or
federal court. The subject matter of the work is quite narrow, its treatment of the subject exhaustive.
To the present generation of trial judges, both state and federal,
there is nothing arcane about postconviction relief. The obligations imposed and the procedures to be followed are clear. State legislatures,
state court rules and congressional action have seen to that. What is
clear now, however, was anything but that a generation ago.
Postconviction relief as we know it today is traceable to the Great
Writ of Habeas Corpus adsubjiciendum and, to a lesser degree, the Writ
of Error Coram Nobis. It is the result of an evolutionary process rooted
in the Magna Car/a and an Anglo-Norman desire to fix its promises
into the reality of English life under the Crown. Neither writ sprang
full-blown from the head of some medieval English jurist. Rather,
each developed in response to the perceived needs of the times. Both
arose as protective devices against the unchecked power of the sovereign exercised either directly or through the King's justices. The work
of Coke and the English common-law judges in fashioning and expanding the writs foreshadowed the efforts of the United States
Supreme Court in fashioning remedies to correct failures of trial courts
in protecting fundamental rights.
Habeas corpus was originally used solely to test the legality of
the
civil
action,
a
separate
as
It
proceeded
pretrial detention of a prisoner.
in nature, and not as an added step in the original action which had led
to custody. When reviewing courts allowed the prisoner to argue that
the trial court had lacked jurisdiction over him, it became a postconviction remedy under the common law.
*

Judge of the New Jersey Superior Court. A.B. cum laude, Fordham University, 1949; J.D.,
Fordham University, 1954.
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The writ of error coram nobis, on the other hand, was brought in the
court of conviction to review alleged factual errors in the trial. If it
succeeded, a new trial was ordered. An applicant did not have to be in
custody to avail himself of this writ. Limited as it was to an allegation
of error in fact which did not appear on the trial record, coram nobis
was not a particularly effective vehicle for postconviction relief and had
largely fallen into disuse in England by the time of the American
Revolution.
In America, postconviction relief developed from a hodgepodge of
procedures varying among the several states and in the federal courts.
In some states there was no direct appeal of a criminal conviction; in
others there was. If allowable, the grounds for appeals and time limitations on taking appeals varied widely. State courts justified relief in
specific cases by relying upon common law habeas corpus, or, to a lesser
extent, coram nobis principles. The results were confusing and unpredictable. No "hornbook law" developed for the guidance of bench or
bar.
Development of postconviction relief in the federal court system
was more uniform because of the direct control the United States
Supreme Court exercised over the appellate process and the Court's
willingness to rely upon and expand habeascorpus as a means of collateral relief. The Supreme Court found, in Johnson v. Zerbst,' that a trial
court which had not protected a defendant's basic constitutional rights
thereby lost its jurisdiction and thus had no power to sentence. Hence
the custody under such a sentence was illegal. In Waley v. Johnson,2
the Court held that habeas corpus was available to raise constitutional
questions whether they went to the trial court's jurisdiction or not.
The truly dramatic development in the field was the Supreme
Court's decision to exercise the power of collateral review over state
court convictions through the federal district courts. Professor Yackle's
analysis of this development conveys a sense of the Court's reluctance
to take that step. The concept of states' rights militated against it, as
did the judicially treasured concept of finality in litigation. However,
there came a point at which the Court concluded that state courts were
giving inadequate protection to individual constitutional rights and
that it was necessary to compel the state courts to do so. Brown v. Allen3 became the watershed case. It permitted federal habeas corpus to
state prisoners to raise Federal Constitutional questions and, in the nature of coram nobis, allowed the prisoner to raise questions of fact, as
well as of law, in the proceeding. The all-encompassing sweep of
federal habeas corpus and its availability to state, as well as federal,
prisoners was hammered home in the trilogy of Fay v. Noia,4 Townsend
I.
2.
3.
4.

304
316
344
372

U.S. 458
U.S. 101
U.S. 443
U.S. 391

(1938).
(1942).
(1953).
(1963).
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v. Sain5 and Sanders v. United States.6 The message to the states was
clear: furnish adequate state postconviction remedies or suffer the embarassment of federal review and rejection of state convictions.
The Court, accepting the flood of applications it surely knew must
follow those decisions, accomplished its goal. Professor Yackle documents how well the states have complied. Meaningful postconviction
remedies are now in place generally, either by virtue of state legislation
or court rule.
The foregoing synopsizes the first third of the book. The remaining
two-thirds is devoted to a minute analysis of the method by which the
Supreme Court arrived at that high-water mark, and what Professor
Yackle believes to be required of a state or federal convict in order to
qualify for federal collateral review. This section makes hard reading.
Relatively few will find it rewarding.
The work shows excellent scholarship. It is well footnoted; it is exhaustive in its treatment of the subject. Professor Yackle analyzes
every basic concept from four or five different perspectives. However,
it is much too detailed for a law school course, nor is it a "how-to"
manual that would be useful in a prison library. A state or federal
public defender surely ought to have it available; a newly appointed
law clerk of a Supreme Court justice would find it helpful.
Yet, as noted at the outset, it is essentially a history book. Each
state court system now knows its responsibility to provide postconviction remedies and has done so. The Supreme Court is now contracting
its willingness to review state convictions and evidencing a sense of judicial trust in state courts. This area of the law seems to have matured
to the point where the ground rules are clear, the procedures are in
place, and little creative activity can be expected in the future. Professor Yackle seems to sense that trend and to be somewhat chagrined at
it. He need not be, for the goal the court set for itself-reform in state
procedures-has been accomplished: federalism is intact and the
Court's energies can now be directed elsewhere. That trend marks a
return to a desirable condition in which the finality of state court convictions is largely assured.

5.
6.

372 U.S. 293 (1963).
373 U.S. 1 (1963).

